OBSERVATIONS

ON

A LETTER

FROM

EARL CORNWALLIS

TO

THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY;

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'Emeritus'

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UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

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OBSERVATIONS, &c.

NOTWITHSTANDING repeated experience of detriment to commanding officers from their imprudence of writing long official letters, the following will exhibit another confpicuous proof of that exceffive weaknefs. Circumfpect magiftrates feldom record, at the time, the reafons upon which they found their decrees, becaufe many decifions have been acknowledged perfectly correct, while the principles they were deduced from appeared erroneous. Would that military magiftrates, too, for the honour of the profeffion, had followed their wife example! It was during the two laft wars this influenza became epidemical. Too many evidences of it, naval as well as military, are extant. The inconfiderate-affected details tranfmitted from Germany, America, and both the Indies, during thofe periods, replete with technical phrafes, and martinet expreffions, unintelligible to Englifh readers, will not, no more than their

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authours, be ſuddenly forgotten. A puerile preſumption of ſcholaſtic ability, to be eſteemed men of the cabinet as well as the field, favoured of both Minervas, induced this infatuation, productive of no better purpoſe than to excite *ſardonic* ſmiles, or provoke to indignation. Soldiers conceited of their literary qualifications are ſtyled in the French armies, " *——s de la plume.*" Cicero was called in deriſion *The learned Conſul.* " Periſh me," exclaimed old Admiral Corniſh, " if ever I go on ſervice " again with a claſſical general, to forego a " Manilla ranſom for the Latin declama-" tions of a Jeſuitical archbiſhop!" Modern commanders, though not quite competent to the Cæſarean " *Vidi Vici,*" or to emulate the energetic preciſion of the celebrated *George Walton*, poſſeſs diſcernment enough, ſurely, to diſtinguiſh, on every occaſion, whether of victory or defeat, the preference of compendious ſimplicity and perſpicuity in their narratives, to the mawkiſh, drawling diſſertations, ſuperfluous as impertinent, " *Quia nunc non erat his locus,*" did not vanity, in this caſe, ſuperſede or faſcinate their judgment.

judgment. The almoſt impoſſibility, likewiſe, of deſcribing operations of war in terms adequate to the perception of even the moſt intelligent and comprehenſive mind, would deter, one might imagine, experienced officers, men of the world, as well as the camp, from ſuch unſeaſonable eſſays. Whenever a pedantic military gazette iſſues from Whitehall, you may, in general, infer ſomething wrong, ſome miſrepreſentation, or ſome miſconduct. A ſcrap beſcrawled, in pencil, upon an aid-de-camp's back, or a drum head, in the Lacedæmonian ſtyle and ſpirit, is the ſure harbinger of propitious and honourable fortune.

Not leſs injudiciouſly have adminiſtration, in the preſent inſtance, laviſhed their premature commendations on ſuch *apochryphal Jeremiahds.* So profuſe, indeed, have been theſe *periodical overtures*, as nearly to exhauſt the language of panegyric; of all ſubjects confeſſedly (in the example before us particularly) the moſt ſterile and inſipid. Let Bedanore and Mangalore ſur-

 render;

render; let Myſore and its metropolis become overſpread, like the reſt of the Eaſt and Weſt Indian Colonies, with Caledonian emigrants; what ſtrain of encomium from the naſal ſeſquialteral trill of Soprano P—; what "IÖ triumph" eulogy, from the corvinal guttural twang of thorough-baſs D——, can be reſounded more rapturous and exulting, than the applauſive Pœans they have already recitatived and choruſſed.

Well ſaid Mr. Fox, "Untimely praiſes "ſhould be ſuſpended, leſt they provoke "diſcuſſion." Happily they *have* provoked it, to the perfect detection of miniſterial artifice, in attempting to make "*Their wart an Oſſa; their mole-hill a huge Olympus!*" in deifying, even with eagle apotheoſis, their fabulous hero, "*Præsens divus habebitur,*" in order to render it profanation to ſcrutinize his conſecrated actions. Be their purpoſe, however, what it may; whether, as uſual, to delude the people, to prevent, by a variety of embarraſſments and perplexed diſquiſitions, the Ithuriel eye, the focus of obſervation, from

concentrating

concentrating on their darkeſt deeds either of negociation or finance; or to incenſe this Engliſh Alexander and his captains, (or more properly the *Scotch Alexander*, who is the real imperator) to challenge ſatisfaction, on their return from the *patriotic band*, for not diſtinguiſhing, what it is impracticable to diſcriminate in parliamentary debates, the agent from the action: a combination which the miniſtry itſelf cemented, and determined to render indiſſoluble, by their moſt *conglutinous* congratulations: Be their projects, I ſay, malevolent and formidable as themſelves, they will not avail to diſcourage an unconfiding yet undaunted oppoſition, from pronouncing what ſtrictures they deem ſuitable to every gradation of miſconduct.

Nor will their rhetorical flouriſhes, on the integrity and diſintereſtedneſs of their demigod,

> " Cujus, in ſenatu, recinet jocoſa
> " Nomen imago."

Which are nothing, in fact, to the argument,

ment, ſave his failures from animadverſion. Already dignified, adorned, and enriched with every diſtinction and advancement, illuſtrious or lucrative, that fortune can communicate; in degree an Earl, in honour a knight of St. George; in place a privy counſellor; in rank a general; in ſtation and emolument a colonel; conſtable of the tower, and governor of India (independent of his family inheritance) What motive, for goodneſs ſake, what inducement can the moſt inſatiable ſpirit thus abundantly gratified, poſſeſs to venality or improbity? Nor, in truth, is his heart tarniſhed or depraved by ſuch ignominious ſtains. He is, in the trueſt Engliſh ſenſe, an honeſt, upright, worthy, honourable gentleman; and in the Roman ſenſe, like Lepidus, "*A tried and valiant ſoldier.*" Be this his unſullied praiſe—his genuine deſert.—To expatiate on his civil adminiſtration, his political career, or his martial exploits, is, in the ironical ſenſe of the Dramatiſt, to be "A d—d good-natured friend "indeed!" Admitting, however, in the utmoſt latitude, the tranſcendent excellence

of

of his civil and military qualifications; what genius can exert or extend its powers, when manifeſtly ſubſervient to the domineering influence of a perpetual dictator? Neither ideas, opinions, judgment, or actions, ſuggeſted and inculcated by another, can be aſcribed to a man himſelf, or be accounted the effect of his own intelligence. In the aſcendant only he moves—he ſpeaks—he breathes, and has his being.

"And in ſome taſte is Lepidus but ſo:
"It is a creature taught by R—— to fight,
"To wind—to ſtop—to run directly on.
"He muſt be taught, and trained, and bid go forth,
"His corporal motion governed by Scotch ſpirit."

Although, in diſcuſſion of the following Letter, as much only of the ſeveral clauſes is inſerted from the original (to avoid prolixity and repetition) as was immediately requiſite for obſervation; yet will there be found, I truſt, no paſſage in this ſelection either perverted, miſtated, miſconſtrued, or miſapplied; not intentionally ſo, I can preſume to pronounce with the certitude of perfect conviction.

LETTER.

LETTER.

No. 1. THE ſtrong fortreſſes of Durwar and Copaul had long been inveſted and beſieged by the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and with ſo little proſpect of ſucceſs, that it had been more than once under the conſideration of the Courts of Poona and Hydrabad, whether they ſhould not convert thoſe ſieges into blockades.

The news of the fall of Bangalore, which ſeemed to have been unexpected by the garriſons of thoſe places, ſo effectually intimidated them, that, although in no ſhape reduced to extremity, or even diſtreſs, they agreed to ſurrender.

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2. After having taken out of that place (viz. Bangalore) *heavy guns and ſupplies of military ſtores*, and proviſions to the utmoſt extent that could be tranſported. —

After having received intimation that General Abercromby, with a battering train, which, in addition to my own, I was in hopes would be ſufficient for the accompliſhment of

our

No. 1. HERE appears a firſt inſtance of the imbecility of our allies; of their little utility to us, indeed, every intelligent and experienced officer, here, as well as abroad, long ago pronounced their conviction. It was from the ſucceſs of the Engliſh arms that the two fortreſſes ſurrendered. " America was conquered in Germany," Durwar and Copaul at Bangalore. Inſtead of uniting with us, they wiſely enriched themſelves, ſeized the ſtores of the captured places, and obtained complete poſſeſſion of the enemy's extenſive and valuable territories, lying between the Kriſtna and Tumbuddra.

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2. The army which then marched from Bangalore, was the moſt formidable and the beſt provided European and native force that ever acted together ſince the Engliſh eſtabliſhment in India. Had they moved early from Bangalore, their heavy cannon might have proved of ſervice. Battering guns and large quantities of ammunition indicate a ſiege of ſome ſtrong hold, and

our object, was at the head of the Pondicherrum Ghaut, and in readinefs to cooperate with me, I moved on the *3d of May* from the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a refpectable and *fufficient* corps of artillery, the Nizam's horfe, His Majefty's 19th regiment of dragoons, &c. &c.

[See No. 13]

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3. Receiving information of my movemant, he (viz. Tippoo) marched by one of the moft direct roads, to his capital.

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4. I knew that he (viz. Tippoo) had long before given orders to burn the villages, and to deftroy the provifions and forage on all the roads by which we could march to Seringapatam.

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5. As there is no place of ftrength near the capital on the north fide of the river, in which I could lodge the *heavy artillery and ftores* in fecurity for a few days, with a moderate garrifon, I was in hopes that I might be able to crofs that river (viz. the Caver.) with

ſieges are works of time, and of fair weather, and not of a day and precarious ſeaſons.

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3. [See No. 9, 12, and 26.]

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4 An additional motive for not committing the event of ſo momentous an enterpriſe to the contracted period of a few remaining weeks of the dry ſeaſon.

[See No. 29.]

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5. To join General Abercromby before an engagement with the enemy, or the ſiege of his capital, was a meaſure the moſt judicious imaginable, and apparently practicable; but then the *heavy cannon* and *cumbrous ſtores* muſt, for a time, have been left

with the whole army, and to effect a junction with General Abercromby before I ſhould find it neceſſary to approach near to the ultimate object of the movement.

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6. By a moſt unaccountable *ſupineneſs* and *want of exertion* on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my *requiſitions* nor orders could overcome, we ſuffered ſome loſs, both in baggage and followers, on the march.

[See No. 31.]

The

behind at Bangalore. General Abercromby, it is aſſerted, had already a battering train with him, ſufficient, probably, to begin the ſiege. If not for weighty ordnance, the Caveri is well known to be fordable, like all other large Indian rivers, about the ſummer ſolſtice, for light field-pieces, in almoſt every part. Once united, the two armies became irreſiſtible, for one alone proved nearly ſo; and how eaſy would it then have been (ſuppoſing the rains ſuſpended) to have reinforced the battering train from Bangalore? The Monſoon once ſet in, all thoughts of opening trenches muſt, of courſe, have been relinquiſhed, and the army would thus have been happily exonerated, on its return, from its inſuperable encumbrance.

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6. Theſe qualified, complaiſant terms of "*want of exertion,*" and "*inactivity,*" but in plain Engliſh, *cowardice*, of the Nizam's cavalry, were neither unaccountable nor could be unexpected, becauſe the ſupineneſs of Indian (not Perſian, Mogul, or Tartar) cavalry, ſerving as mercenaries, when not

counteracted

The inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be *prevailed* upon to forage at a diſtance, frequently occaſioned a ſcarcity in the camp.

[See No. 17.]

7. The

counteracted by expectation of plunder, or defence of their own dwellings and immediate possessions, has been reprobated for ages.

Pretty auxiliaries these, indeed, to whom a commander in chief (exquisitely conscious, at times, of the indispensable necessity of implicit submission and subordination to the very existence of an army, and who makes the Company's troops perfectly sensible of them) is constrained to condescend to requisitions and entreaties, to prevail on them to discharge their duty. Disobedient troops can be considered only as banditti—as no better than voracious locusts—"*Fruges consumere nati*;" and, by their continual defeats, disheartening their fellow-soldiers.

There is still a worse consequence resulting from such dastardly confederates, by their affording European commanders the convenience of imputing the cause of every blunder and miscarriage, to their notorious poltroonery. The battle of Fontenoy was lost,

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7. The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greateſt part of laſt May.—[See No. 21.]

From its bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever ſeen for ſo great a tract in any other river, it appeared *nearly*, if not utterly impracticable to paſs our heavieſt guns over at any ford that could be diſcovered below Seringapatam.

The ford near the village of Kannambady, about eight or nine miles above Seringapatam, over which it was poſitively aſſerted that Hyder Ali had frequently paſſed twelve pounders, and ſometimes heavier guns.

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8. In the event of my being able to cut off the greateſt part of his army.

9. Tippoo

loſt, ſay the Germans and the Engliſh, by the ill-behaviour of the Dutch; and the like has been vented by every European commander in India, from Lawrence to Lepidus.

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7. Theſe paſſages, modified with the term *nearly*, ſeem to admit the practicability of croſſing over at leaſt the light artillery, which requires a track no wider than three or four yards to proceed with eaſe. They agree, alſo, with the concurrent opinions of gentlemen who have traverſed the Caveri near thoſe parts. Thus the heavy cannon is evinced to have been the ſole obſtacle to the army's paſſing this river. During the long vacation at Bangalore, a ford over the Caveri might ſurely have been traced ſomewhere or other, by the offer of handſome rewards, either to the peaſants, or to our own native ſoldiers.

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8. How far this ability became effectual, will be ſeen hereafter.—[See No. 24.]

9. Tippoo, with his whole army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Caveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep ſwampy ravine; the paſſage of which was defended by batteries, running along the whole of his front.

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10. We had ſuffered greatly during the preceding week, by rains uncommonly frequent and heavy ſo early in the ſeaſon.

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11. With the expectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of our temporary diſtreſſes, but tend to bring the war to a very ſpeedy concluſion.

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12. Tippoo, notwithſtanding that we were advancing by a route, for which he was not prepared, did not decline to riſk the event of a battle in a new poſition.

Their infantry, on this occaſion, ſhewed a much better countenance than uſual, which

9. Though Tippoo is frequently ſtigmatized, by his European adverſaries, as a barbarian, no ſemblance of barbariſm appears in this diſpoſition of his forces, to cover his capital.

[See No. 3---12 and 26.]

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10. [See No. 15, and 20.]

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11. Theſe acknowledged temporary diſtreſſes, preceding, it ſeems, any deciſive action with the enemy, manifeſts the imprudence of dragging heavy cannon and ſtores into the field at that critical ſeaſon of the year.

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12. Promptitude, and reciprocal confidence like this, exhibits the magnanimity of a gallant, as well as generous ſoldier; a virtue, though not abſolutely incompatible with tyranny, yet uſually accompanied by qualities more benevolent and humane. That he ſhould prove peculiarly rigorous

which perhaps, may principally be attributed to Tippoo's own presence, and exertions amongst them.

[See No. 3, 9, and 26.]

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13. But even if I had thought the heavy guns that I had brought with me *sufficient* for the siege.

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14. The soil, of all the parts of the Mysore country that I have seen, is in general dry, and by nature unfruitful; and sustenance, either for men or animals, can only be raised upon it, by a most persevering industry in its inhabitants.

[See No. 27.]

15. The

to the Engliſh, may be accounted for, though not juſtified, conſidering their profeſſed, their long, and their inveterate enmity to himſelf and family.

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13. Ignorant of the geography of the whole ſcene of action, as is evident from ſeveral paſſages in this narrative; totally unacquainted with the fords of the Caveri; and uncertain, therefore, of joining General Abercromby; the commander in chief brings heavy guns with him at a precarious ſeaſon, for no other purpoſe, it ſhould ſeem, than to be declared *inſufficient* for the occaſion, on their arrival at the deſtined ſpot; although they had previouſly been pronounced ſufficient. [See No. 2.]

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14. It was experienced to be ſo on the march, from the Carnatic to Bangalore; and not, therefore, to have been further invaded till the rains had produced and left verdure on the foil, and other green forage.

15. The

15. The premature ſetting in of the monſoon, near a month before the uſual period. [See No. 10, and 20.

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16. The road for the heavy guns was to be made the whole way by our own pioneers. I was forced to halt one day after the firſt march, by the draught cattle having been completely exhauſted in accompliſhing it.

Conſiderable detachments of troops were ordered to attend and aſſiſt the heavy guns on the ſecond day's march; but the bullocks were ſo extremely reduced, that, even with the aid of the ſoldiers at the drag-ropes, their progreſs was ſo tedious, that the body of the army was upwards of twelve hours in marching as many miles.

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17. The effects of ſeveral circumſtances from which we had already ſuffered many inconveniences, preſſed upon us particularly

15. The ſeaſons in that country are divided into three, the temperate, the hot, and the wet. But no ſeaſons in any country, or under any climate, are ever accelerated or retarded one entire third of their whole extent.

16. Every difficulty, incidental to this enterprize, ſeems to have ariſen from the impediments created by the heavy cannon, notwithſtanding the prodigious number of cattle appropriated for their draught.

17. "Still harping, quoth Polonius, on "my daughter." Again the Nizam's refractory cavalry, repreſented a little heretofore

larly hard at this juncture; and none more than the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry, who were now, if possible, more *inactive* and more *inattentive* to my *requisitions* than ever.

They had, regardless of my remonstrances since the commencement of our march from Bangalore, hardly ever sent a detachment beyond the picquets of our infantry, and had persevered in exhausting the small stock of forage and provisions.

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18. I could not leave Tippoo at liberty to employ his whole force against General Abercromby; and therefore resolved to remain in my position near *the ford*, which held the main body of the enemy's army in check at Seringapatam, until I should have reason to believe that General Abercromby was out of all danger of being interrupted in his retreat, by Tippoo's marching in person, or considerably reinforcing the corps which I knew he had detached against him, but which alone was not of

sufficient

tofore as obſtructive by action as by inaction. If contumaciouſly diſobedient to *requiſitions* (a new term for orders, and the firſt army, probably, wherein *remonſtrances* were ſubſtituted for commands) Why retain them after ſuch flagrant inſtances of miſbehaviour? [See No. 6.]

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18. Several material facts are here preſented to us.

Neither Tippoo's whole force, nor himſelf in perſon, nor a very conſiderable reinforcement of his troops, nor any corps, ſufficient eſſentially to obſtruct General Abercromby's retreat, marched againſt that General; for if they had, our grand army would, in conſequence, have moved to his ſupport. And he muſt, probably, have been adviſed of the inſufficiency of Tippoo's detach-

ſufficient ſtrength to make me apprehend that it could give General Abercromby any material moleſtation.

[See No. 20.]

19. In

ment to moleſt him, by the ſame expreſs which conveyed the inſtructions to him to retire. For had the enemy's detachments againſt him been conſiderable, the inſtructions would rather have directed to take ſome ſtrong poſt, and not to retire.

How then is the precipitation of that retreat to be accounted for? An army, ſuperiour to any that ever before encountered Hyder Ali or Tippoo (except during this campaign) was then encamped at Periapatam, yet made no reſiſtance to a detachment incapable of moleſting it. No perſon, indeed, can yet account for it; becauſe, ſtrange as it may ſeem, not one official document, relative to the conduct of that retreat, has yet been produced.

It appears alſo, that our principal army kept near a *ford,* in order to croſs, and aſſiſt General Abercromby, provided the Sultan had employed a large force againſt him. Now, had the river proved *unfordable* it would have been uſeleſs for our army to have remained there any longer.

19. In the mean time I gave directions to burst eleven heavy guns; eight eighteen, and three twenty-four pounders; to bury or destroy the military stores that could not be carried with us.

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20. Having remained long enough to give ample time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my encampment near the ford on the morning of the 26th.

As not only our heavy guns were now destroyed, but General Abercromby's corps had actually descended the Ghauts.

21. And

19. How preferable it had been to have left thoſe heavy guns and ſtores behind, is here again apparent. Previous to the army's arrival near Seringapatam, when the ſhowery weather, ſo much complained of, indicated the little uſe that could then be made of them, they might have been deſtroyed or buried to good effect, for the ſake of facilitating the paſſage of the Caveri. A junction with General Abercromby, the firſt conſideration, became then of eaſy attainment.

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20. This clauſe determines, alſo, one ford at leaſt. The battle was fought on the 15th or 16th of May; the rains, ſays the narrative, ſet in during the preceding week, (See No. 10 and 15) that is, let us ſuppoſe about the 9th. A ford was ſubſiſting (notwithſtanding the rains which ſwell the waters) on the 26th. [See No. 18]

If ample time were given for General Abercromby to retreat, before the grand army moved from the ford, ſome account of that retreat muſt ſurely have reached the commander

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21 And to make every other neceſſary preparation for reſuming our operations againſt the enemy's capital, as ſoon as the rivers ſhould ſubſide. [See No. 7.]

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22. Unleſs Tippoo, in the mean time, ſhould agree to make ſuch conceſſions as the confederates might *reaſonably* think they have a right to *exact* from him.

23. I was

commander in chief, for he already knew that General Abercromby had deſcended the Ghauts; yet why he inſerts not the ſmalleſt intimation in his narrative of ſo uncommon an event, and of public notoriety too at the time he wrote, can only be conjectured.

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21. From hence one might naturally be led to imagine, that there actually never had been any obſtacle to croſſing the river; ſince the rivers never ſubſide more than in the month of May, the very height of the dry ſeaſon.

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22. Hence a pacification ſeems not within the Governor General's power; It reſts in the option of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, who are two to one againſt him; or ſhould he meditate a ſeparate peace, they may unite with Tippoo to prevent it. The *reaſonable exaction* here mentioned, ſeems to imply no treaty at all, unleſs very conſiderable conceſſions indeed are thus extorted.

23. Who

23. I was told, to my great ſurprize, that ſome Mahratta meſſengers had arrived to inform me, that the two Mahratta armies were at no great diſtance from us, and that their advanced corps was almoſt in ſight.

From my having even been deprived of all knowledge of their approach, by the vigilance of the enemy's light troops, and the *inactivity* of the Nizam's cavalry,

24. An

23. Who can believe that the Mahratta ſpies, who were in Tippoo's quarters at the time of the battle of Seringapatam (neither interrupted nor intercepted in conveyance of the earlieſt intelligence of his defeat to them) were never able to give notice of their army's approach to the Engliſh camp, which was then almoſt cloſe to that of Tippoo? But the eaſineſs of communication by ſpies between adverſe armies in India, is univerſally known. Amidſt the numerous followers of an army there, it is impoſſible to prevent it. At that very time there muſt have been Mahratta ſpies paſſing between our camp and theirs, to let them know where we were. Had the Engliſh failed of ſucceſs, the Mahrattas would unqueſtionably have inſtantly joined the Sultan to exterminate them from the Carnatic; but they heard of the victory, and precipitated their march to the Engliſh camp, wherein their armed men ſprang up, on a ſudden, like the teeth of Cadmus. Conſidering our General's loſs of draft and carriage cattle, ſcarcity of proviſion, and harraſſed condition, the Mahrattas, from their multitude

24. An opportunity was loſt, which could not now be recalled, to drive the enemy's whole army, that had ſo recently been humbled by a defeat, and would not have dared to keep the field, into the iſland

unimpaired force, were at that inſtant arbiters of his fate. Suppoſing them to have betrayed hoſtile intentions, and to have withheld the grain which they beſtowed for his relief; however reſolute or deſperate, men have neither ſtrength or ſpirit to contend when nearly famiſhed. How much more certain his deſtruction, had their light troops firſt plundered the Bazars on their march, and then laid waſte the environs of every encampment yet left undeſolated by Tippoo. Not that the ſmalleſt merit for fœderal amity is to be allowed the Mahrattas, either for their ſeaſonable ſuccour, or for their forbearance. Their kindneſs is more reaſonably reſolved into the preſent of twelve laaks of rupees, under notion of a loan, promiſed at that time to their chiefs, no doubt, as a conciliatory douceur.

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24. It was loſt, indeed; not from the abſence of the Mahrattas, but from omitting to cannonade, from the heights poſſeſſed by our army after the battle, the defeated troops of Tipppo, huddled and

iſland of Seringapatam, where its diſtreſſes muſt ſoon have reduced Tippoo to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to the terms of peace that we might have *preſcribed* to him.

Which enabled the enemy to avail themſelves of the vicinity of the batteries upon the iſland, and, by retreating to their protection, in the utmoſt confuſion, to ſave their army from entire deſtruction.

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25. I have an entire confidence in meeting with the moſt thorough ſupport from all *your* governments.

26. It

crowded together, under the batteries upon the iſland, in a manner that, from the diſorder uſually attendant on flight, expoſed them to ſlaughter from every ſhot.

[See No. 8.]

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25. In contradiſtinction to *our*; the Governor-general ſeeming to regard himſelf, on all important occaſions, as the King's rather than a Company's ſervant.

All our governments in the Eaſt; the majority of thoſe, I believe, in the Weſt Indies; as well as thoſe in Europe and in America, are poſſeſſed by military perſons; a conjunction of offices incompatible in the Eaſt, becauſe, for their military conduct, they are not reſponſible within the juriſdiction of their own governments; and very little ſo elſewhere, if we may judge from the proceedings of a pending impeachment.

26. A little

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26. It would be in vain to ſuppoſe, that we ſhould remain long undiſturbed by an enemy ſo able and active as Tippoo.

[See No. 3, 9, and 12.]

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27. There is at preſent a favourable opportunity that it (viz. the war) will be terminated with valuable acquiſitions to the Company, and to the other members of the confederacy.

Impelled, however, as I was, by the conſideration of the ſtate of your finances—

And

26. A little further on, this monarch is reprefented as perfidious, barbarous, infatiably ambitious, " *Myforum poftremus*" in fhort, and an object of terrour to all his neighbours: a character irreconcileable in moral poffibility to his acknowledged gallant fpirit, and his repute as a legiflator, ftatefman, cultivator, and protector of his country. It is happy for him that verbal abufe (of which he has received rather more than his due fhare) that the war of words produces no corporeal hurt; nor do hard words, be it remembered, atone for infult.

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27. The war having commenced on the bafis of a partition treaty, [See the celebrated letter to the Nizam, laid before the Houfe of Commons] it is in fact a predatory war, and now confeffedly protracted for the purpofe of *compenfation,* even whilft the allies are rendering their debtors every day more incapable of repaying them.

And of their right (viz. of the allies) to expect fome *compenfation* for their loffes and expences.

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28. In attempting to bring the war to a fpeedy conclufion, the information that I had received of the political affairs of Europe

No acquiſitions, however, in the ſmalleſt degree valuable, can ever be derived to the Eaſt India Company from territorial poſſeſſion. The revenue of one-third of the dominion of Myſore would not, in twenty years, defray the expence incurred by the preſent war, were it to terminate this campaign. By extending their domain, there is a wider and remoter frontier to defend, with a certain charge of additional troops. Nor would the income of the included province, or diſtrict, ever pay for the collection of it, if barren and unproductive as repreſented.—[See No. 14.]—Similar proſpects of future opulence in India, and of that country ſoon becoming a pecuniary reſource to this, have not unfrequently been preſented to us by the grand Comptroller; with what degree of probability, the paſt management, and actual debts of the Company will pretty well aſcertain.

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28. Admitting that war had been actually declared with Spain or Ruſſia, how could it have affected the ſalutary delay

Europe operated, alſo, ſtrongly to induce me to make an effort.

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29. And by that means entirely break his power, before the ſetting-in of the periodical rains—

Without having been attended with any material addition to the expence, which we muſt neceſſarily have incurred, if the army had, during the ſame period, remained in a ſtate of inactivity.

I ſhall certainly, therefore, not relax in the *ſmalleſt degree*, in forwarding the neceſſary preparations to enable me, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will permit, to *reſume* the moſt vigorous proſecution of offenſive operations.

30. The

of the ſiege of Seringapatam till the cloſe of the rains? In that diſtant quarter there could be little danger from either Spaniſh or Ruſſian armaments at any period; and the Company could not then, even by the capture of Seringapatam, have become rich enough to aid England in the conteſt.

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29. The commander in chief was given credit, by every veteran, for the prudence of remaining at Bangalore during the rains; becauſe it appeared too great a riſk—too raſh a procedure, to reduce the attack of Seringapatam to ſo nice and minute a portion of time.—[See No. 4.] It would not have ſtood the public in half the expence of men and money to have placed the army in quarters of refreſhment during the rains, that was incurred by the prodigious ravage and havock of the Monſoon. Tippoo himſelf is ſaid to have loſt above thirty thouſand horſes. What then muſt have been our loſs of draft and carriage cattle? Fifty thouſand will ſcarcely, I ſuppoſe, replace them; for if General Medows, with eighten thou-

30. The

ſand troops, had ſeventy thouſand cattle, twenty-ſix thouſand men muſt have occaſion for one hundred thouſand at leaſt. Then the renewal of camp equipage, of magazines, and of ſtores, muſt be enormous. At all events it may be deemed a fortunate circumſtance, inſtead of a diſappointment to be regretted, that the ſudden rains did prevent our army from undertaking the ſiege. Soldiers can ſuſtain an exceſs of heat or cold, but no troops can endure the rigour of wet, or even damp weather, or the duty of trenches in a ſwampy ſoil, at the confluence of rivers.

If vigorous operations are to be *reſumed*, they muſt, of courſe, coſt as much at leaſt as the original ones did, but moſt likely conſiderably more, on account of the preſent diſtance of the army from Fort St. George, and other depoſits of proviſion and ſtores in the Carnatic.

Had the proper ſeaſon for action been attended, the heavy expence of one more campaign at leaſt would have been ſaved,

far

30. The failure has reflected no disgrace on the British arms.

31. At the time we suffered the greatest inconvenience from the *inactivity* of the Nizam's cavalry, and I expressed my dissatisfaction, in the strongest terms, at the behaviour of the chiefs, I was perfectly sensible, that even *their presence contributed to awe the enemy*, and was otherwise of value, as being a proof of the strong connection of the confederacy.

32. I must

far more chargeable than quarters of refreſhment, a conſideration that ſeems to have been entirely forgotten.

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30. By no means on the bravery and ſpirit of the officers and ſoldiery, native as well as Britiſh.

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31. Prior to this it is obſerved, that "We ſuffered ſome loſs, both in baggage "and followers, on the march towards "Seringapatam, from only a ſmall num-"ber of the enemy's irregular horſe, by a "moſt unaccountable *ſupineneſs* and *want* of "*exertion* on the part of the Nizam's ca-"valry."—[See No. 6.] In another place the Nizam's troops are called "A numer-"ous and powerful body of horſe." Now after ſo many proofs of their puſillanimity, how could the enemy ſtand in awe of them? Five hundred of the beſt might probably have been ſelected from them, to ſome advantage for the ſervice, whoſe preſence would have been equally as good a proof of the alliance: the reſt ought ſurely to have been diſmiſſed.

32. There

32. I muſt, in juſtice to the officers and ſoldiers, both of the King's and Company's troops, who compoſe this army, give my public teſtimony, that during the courſe of a campaign, which from a concurrence of circumſtances, has been ſingularly arduous, they have manifeſted patience under fatigue and ſcarcity, gallantry in action, and a general ſpirit of zeal for the honour and intereſts of their country, which, in my opinion, has never been exceeded.

32. There has ſcarcely been an action in India, wherein the Company's officers have not received this kind of indiſcriminate praiſe from his Majeſty's generals; public thanks for their ſervices have been confered on them, alſo, at the end of every war. With what ſincerity, or what advantage, they are now commended, will be ſeen hereafter. No one in India has ever been able to learn to what good purpoſe they were thus diſtinguiſhed heretofore, as they never yet experienced other return for their ſervices than continual ſuperſeſſion.

"Periere labores, pereat et eorum ingrata merces."

As official diſpatches from military commanders are not formed from authenticated regiſters, wherein daily proceedings are recorded, as on the open journals kept in ſhips of war, to be always referred or appealed to, when expedient, as teſtimonials of the tranſactions themſelves; but are fabricated, reviſed, amended, and corrected

at their own pleaſure, from materials of their own ſelection, diſpoſed at their own leiſure, and uſually ſome time ſubſequent to the occurrence of the ſeveral events: the public, by their repreſentatives, as well as by individuals who pay for them, are clearly entitled, for their own inſtruction, as well as the general ſatisfaction, to examine ſuch productions, to analyze their compoſition, to compare the parts, and to animadvert on the ſeveral repreſentations exhibited in them; for by theſe means alone, can they be enabled to diſtinguiſh real from viſionary objects; and to refrain or beſtow their applauſe with a rational appropriation and diſcernment.

EMERITUS.